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Abstract
We analyze inﬁnite-horizon choice functions within the setting of a simple lin-
ear technology. Time consistency and eﬃciency are characterized by stationary
consumption and inheritance functions, as well as a transversality condition. In
addition, we consider the equity axioms Suppes-Sen, Pigou-Dalton, and resource
monotonicity. We show that Suppes-Sen and Pigou-Dalton imply that the consump-
tion and inheritance functions are monotone with respect to time—thus justifying
sustainability—while resource monotonicity implies that the consumption and in-
heritance functions are monotone with respect to the resource. Examples illustrate
the characterization results.
Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Numbers: D63, D71.
Keywords: Intergenerational resource allocation, inﬁnite-horizon choice.
1 Introduction
The literature on ranking inﬁnite consumption (or utility) streams has produced a num-
ber of negative results in the form of the incompatibility of seemingly mild axioms. For
example, following Koopmans (1960), Diamond (1965) establishes that anonymity is in-
compatible with the strong Pareto principle. Finite anonymity weakens anonymity by
restricting the application of the standard anonymity requirement to situations where
utility streams diﬀer in at most a ﬁnite number of components. Diamond (1965) goes
on to show that strong Pareto, ﬁnite anonymity and a continuity requirement are incom-
patible if the social relation is required to be transitive and complete. Hara, Shinotsuka,
Suzumura and Xu (2005) adapt the well-known strict transfer principle due to Pigou
(1912) and Dalton (1920) to the inﬁnite-horizon context. They show that this principle
is incompatible with strong Pareto and continuity even if the social preference is merely
required to be acyclical. Basu and Mitra (2003) show that strong Pareto, ﬁnite anonymity
and representability by a real-valued function are incompatible. Epstein (1986) establishes
the incompatibility of a set of standard axioms and a substitution property requiring the
possibility to improve upon any given constant stream by means of a stream with lower
initial consumption.
The main purpose of this paper is to suggest an alternative approach that may provide
a promising way to address issues involving intergenerational allocation problems with an
inﬁnite horizon. Instead of searching for a ranking of inﬁnite streams, we examine a
choice-theoretic model where a choice function is used to select a consumption stream
from each set of feasible streams. Because our focus is on the choice-theoretic aspect of
the model, we deliberately consider a simple setting where there is a single resource and
a linear and stationary technology with positive renewal. This implies that the feasibility
of a consumption stream is determined by the initial amount of the resource available,
and the choice function assigns a consumption stream (the chosen consumption stream,
given the feasibility constraint) to each possible initial amount.
We begin with an analysis of two fundamental properties whose versions formulated
for orderings have been used extensively in the literature, namely, eﬃciency and time
consistency. We provide characterizations of all inﬁnite-horizon choice functions satis-
fying either of the two axioms and, moreover, identify all choice functions with both
properties. We then consider equity properties that are choice-theoretic versions of the
Suppes-Sen principle, the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle and resource monotonicity (see
Asheim, Mitra and Tungodden, 2006; Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura, 2006; Hara,
1
Shinotsuka, Suzumura and Xu, 2005, for equity properties imposed on rankings of inﬁnite
streams). Again, classes of inﬁnite-horizon choice functions possessing one of these prop-
erties are characterized, and further axiomatizations are obtained by adding eﬃciency or
time consistency.
The results we obtain are promising. Unlike in the case of orderings of inﬁnite utility
streams, impossibilities can be avoided and rich classes of inﬁnite-horizon choice functions
satisfying several desirable properties do exist. In particular, our choice-theoretic version
of the Suppes-Sen principle imposes full anonymity rather than merely ﬁnite anonymity
and our choice functions may be continuous in the initial endowment. Moreover, it turns
out that the notion of sustainability, which has played a major role in the literature
on intergenerational resource allocation, is closely linked to the Suppes-Sen and Pigou-
Dalton principles. Our conclusion from these results is that the choice-theoretic approach
to intergenerational resource allocation provides an interesting and viable alternative to
the models based on establishing orderings of inﬁnite utility streams, and we propose to
explore this approach further.
Section 2 contains some basic deﬁnitions and a ﬁrst well-known observation charac-
terizing sets of feasible consumption streams. In Section 3, we examine the fundamental
axioms of eﬃciency and time consistency. We characterize all eﬃcient inﬁnite-horizon
choice functions, all time-consistent inﬁnite-horizon choice functions, and the class of
choice functions satisfying both requirements. Section 4 deals with the equity axioms
a` la Suppes-Sen, Pigou-Dalton and resource monotonicity. We characterize all inﬁnite-
horizon choice functions satisfying: (i) Suppes-Sen; (ii) eﬃciency and Pigou-Dalton; (iii)
time consistency and Suppes-Sen; (iv) eﬃciency, time consistency and Pigou-Dalton; (v)
eﬃciency, time consistency and resource monotonicity. As a by-product of our analysis,
we show that the conjunction of eﬃciency and Pigou-Dalton is equivalent to Suppes-Sen.
Section 5 provides some examples and Section 6 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
Let R+ and R++ denote the set of all non-negative real numbers and the set of all positive
real numbers, respectively. Analogously, Z+ and Z++ denote the set of all non-negative
integers and the set of all positive integers, respectively.
Deﬁne the set Y = R ++ to be the set of all sequences y = (y0, y1, . . . , yt, . . .). We
interpret y as a consumption stream, where yt is the amount of a single resource consumed
in period t ∈ Z+. Time is measured relative to the present: period t is the tth period after
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today. The initial amount of the resource is x ∈ R+. We assume a linear and stationary
technology, entailing that in each period, the resource is renewed at the ﬁxed positive rate
r ∈ R++.
We use the following notation for inequalities in Y. For all y, z ∈ Y, y ≥ z if and only
if yt ≥ zt for all t ∈ Z+, and y > z if and only if y ≥ z and y = z.
For x ∈ R+ and y ∈ Y, the sequence of resource stocks
k(x, y) = (k0(x, y), k1(x, y), . . . , kt(x, y), . . .) ∈ R +
generated by x and y is deﬁned by k0(x, y) = x and
kt(x, y) = (1 + r)(kt−1(x, y)− yt−1)
for all t ∈ Z++. For x ∈ R+, the set of x-feasible consumption streams is
S(x) = {y ∈ Y | yt ∈ [0, kt(x, y)] for all t ∈ Z+}.
It is immediate that the set of x-feasible consumption streams can equivalently be ex-
pressed as in the following lemma; see, for instance, Epstein (1986) who made this obser-
vation in his analysis of the linear model in an intertemporal social choice setting.
Lemma 1 For all x ∈ R+,
S(x) =
{
y ∈ Y
∣∣∣ ∞∑
t=0
yt
(1 + r)t
≤ x
}
.
3 Eﬃcient and time-consistent choice
An inﬁnite-horizon choice function is a mapping C : R+ → Y such that C(x) ∈ S(x) for
all x ∈ R+. This function assigns a consumption stream to any given initial amount of
a single resource available in the economy. Note that consumption streams are undated:
whether the choice takes place today or tomorrow makes no diﬀerence if the same initial
endowment is present. This time-independence feature of a choice function ensures that
the choice of a starting period is irrelevant. For all t ∈ Z+, we write Ct(x) for the tth
component of the sequence C(x).
The ﬁrst fundamental property of an inﬁnite-horizon choice function is the familiar
eﬃciency axiom. It requires that no x-feasible consumption stream Pareto dominates the
chosen consumption stream with initial stock x.
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Eﬃciency. For all x ∈ R+ and for all y ∈ Y,
y > C(x) ⇒ y ∈ S(x).
Given Lemma 1, it is straightforward to characterize the class of eﬃcient choice func-
tions. We omit the immediate proof of the following lemma stating the relevant result.
Lemma 2 An inﬁnite-horizon choice function C satisﬁes eﬃciency if and only if
∞∑
t=0
Ct(x)
(1 + r)t
= x for all x ∈ R+. (C1)
Time consistency prevents deviations from chosen consumption streams as time pro-
gresses. Thus, for any x ∈ R+ and for any t, τ ∈ Z+, the consumption Ct+τ (x) in period
t+ τ for the initial endowment x should be the same as the consumption Cτ (kt(x, C(x)))
in period τ for the initial endowment kt(x, C(x)).
Time consistency. For all x ∈ R+ and for all t, τ ∈ Z+,
Ct+τ (x) = Cτ (kt(x, C(x))).
We now characterize all inﬁnite-horizon choice functions satisfying time consistency.
In order to express this class of choice functions, we use a function g : R+ → R+ that
indicates, for each initial level of the resource, the amount of the resource that is available
in the next period after the present consumption has taken place. Hence, we may refer
to g as the inheritance function. Consequently, g(x)/(1 + r) is the bequest that is left
behind, and x − (g(x)/(1 + r)) is the present consumption. Hence, we may refer to the
mapping x 	→ x− (g(x)/(1 + r)) as the consumption function.
For any function g : R+ → R+, let the function g0 : R+ → R+ be deﬁned by g0(x) =
x for all x ∈ R+ and, for all t ∈ Z++, deﬁne the function gt : R+ → R+ by letting
gt(x) = g(gt−1(x)) for all x ∈ R+. As will become clear once our characterization of time
consistency is stated, the functions gt have a natural interpretation: they identify the
amount of the resource available in period t as a function of the initial endowment x only.
Because all these functions are determined once a function g is chosen, it is suﬃcient to
specify, for any initial endowment, the amount of the resource remaining at the beginning
of period one.
The following lemma characterizes all time-consistent choice functions.
4
Lemma 3 An inﬁnite-horizon choice function C satisﬁes time consistency if and only if
there exists a function g : R+ → R+ such that
g(x) ≤ x(1 + r) for all x ∈ R+ (G1)
and
Ct(x) = g
t(x)− g
t+1(x)
1 + r
for all t ∈ Z+ and for all x ∈ R+. (CG)
Proof. ‘If.’ Let C be an inﬁnite-horizon choice function and suppose there exists a
function g : R+ → R+ such that (G1) and (CG) are satisﬁed. Let x ∈ R+ and t ∈ Z+. By
(G1), it follows that
gt+1(x) = g(gt(x)) ≤ gt(x)(1 + r)
and, together with (CG), that
Ct(x) = g
t(x)− g
t+1(x)
1 + r
≥ 0.
Using (CG) and the deﬁnition of k(x, y), we obtain
kt(x, C(x)) = g
t(x). (1)
Because g is non-negative-valued, (CG) and (1) together imply
Ct(x) = g
t(x)− g
t+1(x)
1 + r
= kt(x, C(x))− g
t+1(x)
1 + r
≤ kt(x, C(x)).
Hence, C(x) ∈ S(x) and C is a well-deﬁned inﬁnite-horizon choice function.
To establish time consistency, let x ∈ R+ and t, τ ∈ Z+. By (CG),
Ct+τ (x) = g
t+τ (x)− g
t+τ+1(x)
1 + r
. (2)
By (1) and (CG),
Cτ (kt(x, C(x))) = Cτ (g
t(x)) = gτ (gt(x))− g
τ+1(gt(x))
1 + r
= gt+τ (x)− g
t+τ+1(x)
1 + r
which, together with (2), proves that C is time consistent.
‘Only if.’ Suppose C is an inﬁnite-horizon choice function that satisﬁes time consis-
tency. Deﬁne the function g : R+ → R+ by letting
g(x) = (1 + r)(x− C0(x)) (3)
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for all x ∈ R+. By feasibility, C0(x) ∈ [0, x], and the deﬁnition of g immediately implies
g(x) ∈ [0, x(1+ r)] for all x ∈ R+, establishing that g indeed maps into R+ and that (G1)
is satisﬁed.
It remains to be shown that (CG) is satisﬁed. We proceed by induction. Solving (3)
for C0(x), we obtain
C0(x) = x− g(x)
1 + r
= g0(x)− g
1(x)
1 + r
. (4)
Now suppose
Ct(x) = g
t(x)− g
t+1(x)
1 + r
(5)
for some t ∈ Z+. By deﬁnition, k1(x, C(x)) = (1 + r)(x − C0(x)) = g(x). Thus, using
time consistency and (5), we obtain
Ct+1(x) = Ct(k1(x, C(x))) = Ct(g(x)) = g
t(g(x))− g
t+1(g(x))
1 + r
= gt+1(x)− g
t+2(x)
1 + r
which completes the proof.
We now characterize all inﬁnite-horizon choice functions satisfying both eﬃciency and
time consistency.
Theorem 1 An inﬁnite-horizon choice function C satisﬁes eﬃciency and time consis-
tency if and only if there exists a function g : R+ → R+ such that (CG), (G1) and
lim
t→∞
gt(x)
(1 + r)t
= 0 for all x ∈ R+ (G2)
are satisﬁed.
Proof. ‘If.’ Let C be an inﬁnite-horizon choice function and suppose there exists a func-
tion g : R+ → R+ such that (CG), (G1) and (G2) are satisﬁed. Then, by Lemma 3, C is a
well-deﬁned inﬁnite-horizon choice function that satisﬁes time consistency. Furthermore,
∞∑
t=0
Ct(x)
(1 + r)t
= x− lim
t→∞
gt(x)
(1 + r)t
.
By invoking Lemma 2, (G2) implies that C satisﬁes eﬃciency.
‘Only if.’ Suppose C is an inﬁnite-horizon choice function that satisﬁes eﬃciency and
time consistency. Then, by Lemma 3, there exists a function g : R+ → R+ such that (CG)
and (G1) are satisﬁed. By invoking Lemma 2, eﬃciency and (CG) imply that
x =
∞∑
t=0
Ct(x)
(1 + r)t
= x− lim
t→∞
gt(x)
(1 + r)t
.
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Hence, g satisﬁes (G2).
Condition (G2) is of course a capital value transversality condition, which has been
used to characterize eﬃcient capital accumulation at least since Malinvaud (1953).
The properties (G1) and (G2) of a function g : R+ → R+ are independent, as is
straightforward to verify. That (CG) must be satisﬁed is a consequence of the time-
consistency requirement, and (G1) ensures that this is done without violating the resource
constraints. Property (G2) is required for the eﬃciency axiom.
4 Imposing equity axioms
We now examine the consequences of imposing certain equity axioms, in addition to
eﬃciency and time consistency.
The ﬁrst of the equity axioms that we consider—Suppes-Sen—requires that no x-
feasible consumption stream has a permutation which Pareto dominates the chosen con-
sumption stream with initial stock x. The term ‘permutation’ signiﬁes a bijective mapping
π of Z+ onto itself. The Suppes-Sen axiom is a straightforward adaptation of the Suppes-
Sen principle for orderings (cf. Suppes, 1966; Sen, 1970) to the present inﬁnite-horizon
choice-theoretic setting.
Suppes-Sen. For all x ∈ R+ and for all y, y′ ∈ Y, if y′ is a permutation of y, then
y′ > C(x) ⇒ y ∈ S(x).
Clearly, the Suppes-Sen axiom implies eﬃciency. Note that we do not restrict the scope
of the axiom to ﬁnite permutations (that is, permutations π with the property that there is
a t ∈ Z+ such that π(τ) = τ for all τ ≥ t). In contrast to the Suppes-Sen axiom formulated
for orderings of inﬁnite utility streams, allowing for inﬁnite permutations does not lead
to an impossibility in the choice-theoretic setting, given our technological environment.
This is established by combining our next result, which characterizes all choice functions
satisfying the Suppes-Sen principle, with the fact that, for any initial resource stock, there
exists a non-empty set of eﬃcient and non-decreasing streams.
Lemma 4 An inﬁnite-horizon choice function C satisﬁes Suppes-Sen if and only if (C1)
and
Ct(x) ≤ Ct+1(x) for all x ∈ R+ and for all t ∈ Z+ (C2)
are satisﬁed.
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Proof. ‘If.’ Assume (C1) and (C2) are satisﬁed. Since the sequence 〈1/(1 + r)t〉t∈ + is
decreasing and the sequence 〈Ct(x)〉t∈ + is non-decreasing, if y is a permutation of C(x),
then ∞∑
t=0
yt
(1 + r)t
≥ x.
Hence, for all y, y′ ∈ Y such that y′ is a permutation of y, y′ > C(x) implies
∞∑
t=0
yt
(1 + r)t
> x.
By Lemma 1, y ∈ S(x). Thus, C satisﬁes Suppes-Sen.
‘Only if.’ Let x ∈ R+. Suppose ﬁrst that
∑∞
t=0 Ct(x)/(1+ r)
t < x. Then by Lemma 1,
there exists y ∈ S(x) such that y > C(x). Thus, there is an x-feasible consumption stream
which Pareto-dominates the chosen consumption stream with initial stock x, entailing that
C does not satisfy Suppes-Sen. Together with feasibility, this contradiction implies that
we must have
∑∞
t=0 Ct(x)/(1 + r)
t = x. By way of contradiction, suppose there exists
τ ∈ Z+ such that Cτ (x) > Cτ+1(x). Construct y ∈ Y as follows:
yt =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
Ct(x) if t ∈ {τ, τ + 1},
Cτ+1(x) if t = τ,
Cτ (x) + r(Cτ (x)− Cτ+1(x)) if t = τ + 1.
Then
∞∑
t=0
yt
(1 + r)t
=
∑
t ∈{τ,τ+1}
Ct(x)
(1 + r)t
+
1
(1 + r)τ
(
Cτ+1(x) +
Cτ (x) + r(Cτ (x)− Cτ+1(x))
1 + r
)
=
∞∑
t=0
Ct(x)
(1 + r)t
= x,
implying by Lemma 1 that y ∈ S(x). Construct y′ ∈ Y from y by permuting yτ and
yτ+1. Since r(Cτ (x)− Cτ+1(x)) > 0, we have that y′ > C(x). Thus, there is an x-feasible
consumption stream with a permutation which Pareto-dominates the chosen consumption
stream with initial stock x, entailing that C does not satisfy Suppes-Sen.
As is apparent from the proof, the Suppes-Sen principle as stated in the lemma can
be replaced with its ﬁnite counterpart, restricting its conclusion to ﬁnite permutations.
In our setting, the two properties are equivalent and we chose to use the general version
in order to illustrate that, unlike the model based on orderings of inﬁnite streams, our
approach does not lead to an impossibility when inﬁnite permutations are permitted.
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The observation that the Suppes-Sen axiom can allow for inﬁnite permutations with-
out leading to an impossibility in the choice-theoretic setting is robust with respect to
modiﬁcations in our technological assumptions. To see this, consider the technological
assumptions of immediate productivity and eventual productivity, as deﬁned by Asheim,
Buchholz and Tungodden (2001, p. 259). The assumption of immediate productivity
states that if y ∈ Y with yτ > yτ+1 for some τ ∈ Z+ is feasible, then y′ ∈ Y constructed
by
y′t =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
yt if t ∈ {τ, τ + 1},
yτ+1 if t = τ,
yτ if t = τ + 1
is feasible and ineﬃcient. The assumption of eventual productivity states that, for any
initial resource stock(s) and time, there exists an eﬃcient and equally-distributed stream.
The class of technologies that satisfy the assumptions of immediate productivity and even-
tual productivity includes the simple linear and stationary technologies that we consider
throughout this paper. However, this class is far wider than this, as illustrated by Asheim,
Buchholz and Tungodden (2001, Examples 1–3).
In a technology satisfying eventual productivity, the choice function assigning to any
initial resource stock(s) and time the eﬃcient and equally-distributed stream is an eﬃcient,
time consistent choice function satisfying even the inﬁnite permutation Suppes-Sen axiom.
Hence, provided that the assumption of eventual productivity is satisﬁed, the Suppes-Sen
axiom can allow for inﬁnite permutations without leading to an impossibility in the choice-
theoretic setting. If we add immediate productivity, we obtain a generalization of Lemma
4: An inﬁnite-horizon choice function satisﬁes Suppes-Sen if and only if, for any initial
resource stock(s) and time, the chosen stream is eﬃcient and non-decreasing. Also the
latter result allows for the version of Suppes-Sen axiom that includes inﬁnite permutations,
although it continues to hold if the axiom is replaced by its ﬁnite permutation counterpart.
The second of the equity axioms—Pigou-Dalton—requires that no x-feasible consump-
tion stream can be generated from the chosen consumption stream with initial stock x
through a transfer of consumption from a better-oﬀ to a worse-oﬀ generation. The axiom
is a straightforward adaptation of the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle (cf. Pigou, 1912;
Dalton, 1920) for social welfare orderings to the present choice-theoretic setting.
Pigou-Dalton. For all x ∈ R+ and for all y, y′ ∈ Y, if there exist ε ∈ R++ and τ, τ ′ ∈ Z+
such that yτ = y
′
τ − ε ≥ y′τ ′ + ε = yτ ′ and yt = y′t for all t ∈ Z+\{τ, τ ′}, then
y′ = C(x) ⇒ y ∈ S(x).
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Unlike the Suppes-Sen principle, Pigou-Dalton does not imply eﬃciency. However,
it rules out all violations of eﬃciency that do not involve equally-distributed streams.
As will become clear in the proof of the following theorem, eﬃciency could therefore be
replaced with a weaker axiom that applies to equal distributions only. We chose to keep
the standard eﬃciency axiom for clarity and ease of exposition.
We now characterize all inﬁnite-horizon choice functions satisfying eﬃciency and the
Pigou-Dalton principle. Interestingly, this is the same class as the one identiﬁed in the
previous lemma.
Lemma 5 An inﬁnite-horizon choice function C satisﬁes eﬃciency and Pigou-Dalton if
and only if (C1) and (C2) are satisﬁed.
Proof. ‘If.’ Assume (C1) and (C2) are satisﬁed. By Lemma 2, C satisﬁes eﬃciency.
Since the sequence 〈1/(1 + r)t〉t∈ + is decreasing and the sequence 〈Ct(x)〉t∈ + is non-
decreasing, if yτ = Cτ (x)− ε ≥ Cτ ′(x) + ε = yτ ′ for some ε ∈ R++ and yt = Ct(x) for all
t ∈ Z+ \ {τ, τ ′}, then ∞∑
t=0
yt
(1 + r)t
> x.
By Lemma 1, y ∈ S(x). Thus, C satisﬁes Pigou-Dalton.
‘Only if.’ Suppose
∑∞
t=0 Ct(x)/(1 + r)
t < x. Then by Lemma 1, there exists y ∈ S(x)
such that y > C(x). Thus, there is an x-feasible consumption stream which Pareto
dominates the chosen consumption stream with initial stock x, entailing that C does not
satisfy eﬃciency. Therefore, using feasibility, we must have
∑∞
t=0 Ct(x)/(1 + r)
t = x.
Now suppose there exists τ ∈ Z+ such that Cτ(x) > Cτ+1(x). Construct y ∈ Y as
follows:
yt =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
Ct(x) if t ∈ {τ, τ + 1},
Cτ (x)− ε if t = τ,
Cτ+1(x) + ε if t = τ + 1,
where 0 < ε ≤ (Cτ (x)− Cτ+1(x))/2, so that yτ = Cτ (x)− ε ≥ Cτ+1(x) + ε = yτ+1. Then
∞∑
t=0
yt
(1 + r)t
=
∑
t ∈{τ,τ+1}
Ct(x)
(1 + r)t
+
1
(1 + r)τ
(
Cτ (x)− ε + Cτ+1(x) + ε
1 + r
)
=
∞∑
t=0
Ct(x)
(1 + r)t
− rε
(1 + r)τ+1
< x,
implying by Lemma 1 that y ∈ S(x). Thus, an x-feasible consumption stream can be
generated from the chosen consumption stream with initial stock x through a transfer of
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consumption from a better-oﬀ to a worse-oﬀ generation, entailing that C does not satisfy
Pigou-Dalton.
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of the previous two lemmas.
Corollary 1 An inﬁnite-horizon choice function C satisﬁes Suppes-Sen if and only if C
satisﬁes eﬃciency and Pigou-Dalton.
The following theorem identiﬁes all choice functions satisfying time consistency in
addition to Suppes-Sen (or, equivalently, in addition to eﬃciency and Pigou-Dalton).
Theorem 2 An inﬁnite-horizon choice function C satisﬁes time consistency and Suppes-
Sen (or eﬃciency, time consistency and Pigou-Dalton) if and only if there exists a function
g : R+ → R+ such that (CG), (G1), (G2),
x ≤ g(x) for all x ∈ R+ (G3)
and
x− g(x)
1 + r
≤ g(x)− g
2(x)
1 + r
for all x ∈ R+ (G4)
are satisﬁed.
Proof. ‘If.’ Suppose there exists a function g : R+ → R+ such that (CG), (G1), (G2),
(G3) and (G4) are satisﬁed. By Theorem 1, C satisﬁes time consistency and eﬃciency.
Thus, by Lemma 2, (C1) is satisﬁed. By (CG) and (G4), it follows that
Ct(x) = g
t(x)− g
t+1(x)
1 + r
= gt(x)− g(g
t(x))
1 + r
≤ g(gt(x))− g
2(gt(x))
1 + r
= gt+1(x)− g
t+2(x)
1 + r
= Ct+1(x)
for all x ∈ R+ and for all t ∈ Z+. Hence, by Lemma 4, C satisﬁes Suppes-Sen.
‘Only if.’ Assume that C satisﬁes time consistency and Suppes-Sen. By Lemma 4,
(C1) and (C2) are satisﬁed and, by Lemma 2, C satisﬁes eﬃciency. By Theorem 1, there
exists a function g : R+ → R+ satisfying (CG), (G1) and (G2).
To show (G3), suppose there exists x ∈ R+ such that x > g(x). By (CG) and (G2), it
follows that ∞∑
t=0
Ct(x)
(1 + r)t
= x > g(x) =
∞∑
t=0
Ct+1(x)
(1 + r)t
,
contradicting (C2).
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To show (G4), suppose there exists x ∈ R+ such that
x− g(x)
1 + r
> g(x)− g
2(x)
1 + r
.
By (CG),
C0(x) = x− g(x)
1 + r
> g(x)− g
2(x)
1 + r
= C1(x),
again contradicting (C2).
Condition (G3) ensures sustainable development in the sense that the current con-
sumption can potentially be shared by all future generations. In the context of a station-
ary technology with only one resource (or capital good), this requires that the resource
stock is maintained from the current period to the next, which is just what condition
(G3) entails. Condition (G4) complements (G3) by requiring that the potential for shar-
ing present consumption with future generations actually materializes. Hence, Theorem
2 means that both the Suppes-Sen axiom and the Pigou-Dalton axiom can be used to
justify sustainability in the present choice-theoretic setting.
Theorem 2 thereby echoes similar results when inﬁnite-horizon social choice is analyzed
through social welfare relations.
• In particular, Asheim, Buchholz and Tungodden (2001) show how the Suppes-Sen
principle for social welfare relations can be used to rule out unsustainable consump-
tion streams as maximal elements under technological conditions satisﬁed by the
simple linear model considered here. Given such technological assumptions, this
result also implies that social welfare relations like those considered in Asheim and
Tungodden (2004), Basu and Mitra (2006), and Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura
(2006), which all satisfy the Suppes-Sen principle, yield sustainable consumption
streams as maximal elements as long as maximal elements exist.
• Asheim (1991) shows in a similar way how the Pigou-Dalton principle for social
welfare relations can be used to rule out unsustainable consumption streams.
Another equity axiom that appears to be natural in this context is resource monotonic-
ity. It requires that no one should be worse oﬀ as a consequence of an increase in the
initial level of the resource. See Thomson (2006) for a discussion of resource monotonicity
in a variety of economic models and further references. Formulated for inﬁnite-horizon
choice functions, the axiom is deﬁned as follows.
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Resource monotonicity. For all x, x′ ∈ R+,
x > x′ ⇒ C(x) ≥ C(x′).
Adding resource monotonicity to eﬃciency and time consistency leads to the choice
functions characterized in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 An inﬁnite-horizon choice function C satisﬁes eﬃciency, time consistency
and resource monotonicity if and only if there exists a function g : R+ → R+ such that
(CG), (G1), (G2),
g is non-decreasing in x (G5)
and
x 	→ x− g(x)
1 + r
is non-decreasing in x (G6)
are satisﬁed.
Proof. ‘If.’ Assume that there exists a function g : R+ → R+ such that (CG), (G1), (G2),
(G5) and (G6) are satisﬁed. By Theorem 1, C satisﬁes eﬃciency and time consistency.
Let x > x′. By (G5), we have that
gt(x) ≥ gt(x′)
for all t ∈ Z+. Consequently, since (CG) and (G6) are satisﬁed, it follows that
Ct(x) = g
t(x)− g
t+1(x)
1 + r
= gt(x)− g(g
t(x))
1 + r
≥ gt(x′)− g(g
t(x′))
1 + r
= gt(x′)− g
t+1(x′)
1 + r
= Ct(x
′)
for all t ∈ Z+. Hence, C satisﬁes resource monotonicity.
‘Only if.’ Assume that C satisﬁes time consistency, eﬃciency and resource monotonic-
ity. By Theorem 1, there exists a function g : R+ → R+ such that (CG), (G1) and (G2)
are satisﬁed.
To show (G5), suppose there exist x, x′ ∈ R+ such that x > x′, but g(x) < g(x′). By
(CG) and (G2), it follows that
∞∑
t=1
Ct(x)
(1 + r)t−1
= g(x) < g(x′) =
∞∑
t=1
Ct(x
′)
(1 + r)t−1
,
contradicting resource monotonicity.
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To show (G6), suppose there exist x, x′ ∈ R+ such that x > x′, but
x− g(x)
1 + r
< x′ − g(x
′)
1 + r
.
By (CG),
C0(x) = x− g(x)
1 + r
< x′ − g(x
′)
1 + r
= C0(x
′),
again contradicting resource monotonicity.
Note that the proof of (G5) relies on eﬃciency, whereas (G6) is established without
using this axiom.
It follows from Theorems 2 and 3 that the classes of choice functions characterized
in Theorem 1 can be narrowed down considerably by adding equity axioms. However,
Suppes-Sen or Pigou-Dalton, on the one hand, and resource monotonicity, on the other
hand, do so in diﬀerent ways.
• By Theorem 2, Suppes-Sen or eﬃciency and Pigou-Dalton in combination with time
consistency imply that, for given x ∈ R+, gt(x) and gt(x) − (gt+1(x)/(1 + r)) are
monotone with respect to t, while
• by Theorem 3, resource monotonicity in combination with eﬃciency and time con-
sistency implies that gt(x) and gt(x)− (gt+1(x)/(1 + r)) are monotone with respect
to x for given t ∈ Z+.
5 Examples
To ensure that the choice functions in the examples of this section are well-deﬁned it is
important that the renewal rate r is positive, as we have assumed throughout. Consider
ﬁrst the steady-state example, where consumption is equalized across generations.
Example 1. The inﬁnite-horizon choice function C1 of this example corresponds to the
case in which the function g is the identity mapping, deﬁned by g(x) = x for all x ∈ R+.
This implies gt(x) = x for all x ∈ R+ and for all t ∈ Z+. (G1) and (G2) are satisﬁed
because
g(x) = x ≤ x(1 + r)
and
lim
t→∞
gt(x)
(1 + r)t
= lim
t→∞
x
(1 + r)t
= 0
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for all x ∈ R+. According to (CG),
C1t (x) = g
t(x)− g
t+1(x)
1 + r
= x− x
1 + r
=
xr
1 + r
(6)
for all x ∈ R+ and for all t ∈ Z+, that is, every generation consumes the same amount.
In addition to satisfying time consistency and eﬃciency, the inﬁnite-horizon choice
function C1 is characterized by a g-function for which the conditions of (G3) and (G4)
hold with equality. By Theorem 2 this entails that C1 satisﬁes both Suppes-Sen and
Pigou-Dalton. Furthermore, both g(x) and x − (g(x)/(1 + r)) are non-decreasing in x.
Hence, by Theorem 3, the choice function satisﬁes resource monotonicity, as can easily be
veriﬁed directly from (6).
A generalization of the choice function C1 of Example 1 is obtained by letting g be
a linear function such that both g(x) and x − (g(x)/(1 + r)) are non-decreasing in x, so
that resource monotonicity is satisﬁed.
Example 2. The inﬁnite-horizon choice function C2,a of this example is obtained by
letting g(x) = ax for all x ∈ R+, where a ∈ [0, 1 + r] is a parameter. Obviously, the
steady-state case is obtained for a = 1. It follows that gt(x) = atx for all x ∈ R+ and for
all t ∈ Z+. Clearly, (G1) is satisﬁed because
g(x) = ax ≤ x ≤ x(1 + r)
for all x ∈ R+. (G2) is satisﬁed if and only if a < 1 + r because
lim
t→∞
gt(x)
(1 + r)t
= lim
t→∞
atx
(1 + r)t
= lim
t→∞
( a
1 + r
)t
x = 0.
Hence, the case where a = 1 + r illustrates how (G2) can be violated by excessive accu-
mulation of the resource.
Substituting into (CG), it follows that
C2,at (x) = g
t(x)− g
t+1(x)
1 + r
= atx− a
t+1x
1 + r
=
at(1 + r − a)x
1 + r
(7)
for all x ∈ R+ and for all t ∈ Z+.
In addition to satisfying eﬃciency and time consistency for a < 1 + r, the inﬁnite-
horizon choice function C2,a is characterized by a g-function for which the conditions of
(G3) and (G4) hold if and only if a ≥ 1. By Theorem 2 this entails that C2,a satisﬁes
eﬃciency, time consistency, Suppes-Sen and Pigou-Dalton if and only if a ∈ [1, 1 + r). If
15
a ∈ (1, 1 + r), then consumption is increasing in t, and the consumption of generations t
such that
t >
ln(r)− ln(1 + r − a)
ln(a)
is higher than that of the steady-state, at the expense of earlier generations. Moreover,
the consumption of generation t approaches inﬁnity as t approaches inﬁnity.
Both g(x) and x − (g(x)/(1 + r)) are non-decreasing in x for any a ∈ [0, 1 + r].
Hence, by Theorem 3, the choice function satisﬁes time consistency, eﬃciency and resource
monotonicity if and only if a ∈ [0, 1 + r), as can easily be veriﬁed directly from (7).
Therefore, C2,a satisﬁes resource monotonicity, but not Suppes-Sen and Pigou-Dalton,
if and only if a ∈ [0, 1). If a ∈ (0, 1), then consumption is decreasing in t, and the
consumption of generations t such that
t <
ln(r)− ln(1 + r − a)
ln(a)
is higher than that of the steady-state, at the expense of later generations. Moreover, the
consumption of generation t approaches zero as t approaches inﬁnity.
Example 2 shows, in the case where a < 1, that gt(x) and gt(x) − (gt+1(x)/(1 + r))
can be non-decreasing with respect to x, without gt(x) and gt(x)− (gt+1(x)/(1+r)) being
non-decreasing with respect to t. In particular, a choice function can satisfy resource
monotonicity without satisfying Suppes-Sen and Pigou-Dalton. In the following pair
of examples, we show that a choice function can satisfy Suppes-Sen and Pigou-Dalton
without satisfying resource monotonicity.
Example 3. The inﬁnite-horizon choice function C3 of this example is obtained by setting
r = 1, so that 1 + r = 2, and by letting g be given by:
g(x) =
⎧⎨
⎩
3
2
x if 0 ≤ x ≤ 1,
4
3
x if x > 1 .
Clearly, (G1) is satisﬁed. Also, x ≤ g(x) for all x ∈ R+ so that (G3) is satisﬁed, and
x − g(x)/2 is an increasing function of x so that (G6) is satisﬁed. By combining these
observations we obtain that x − g(x)/2 ≤ g(x) − g2(x)/2 for all x ∈ R+ so that (G4) is
satisﬁed. Furthermore, if x ∈ R++, then C3 behaves as C2,a with a ∈ (0, 1 + r) when t
goes to inﬁnity, implying that (G2) is satisﬁed. If x = 0, then (G2) is trivially satisﬁed.
Hence, it follows from Theorem 2 that the inﬁnite-horizon choice function C3 satisﬁes
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eﬃciency, time consistency, Suppes-Sen and Pigou-Dalton. However,
g(1) = 3
2
> 17
12
= g
(
17
16
)
.
Hence, (G5) does not hold, and it follows from Theorem 3 that C3 does not satisfy resource
monotonicity.
Example 4. The inﬁnite-horizon choice function C4 of this example is obtained by setting
r = 1, so that 1 + r = 2, and by letting g be given by:
g(x) =
⎧⎨
⎩
4
3
x if 0 ≤ x ≤ 1,
3
2
x if x > 1.
Clearly, (G1) is satisﬁed. Also, x ≤ g(x) for all x ∈ R+ so that (G3) is satisﬁed, and g(x)
is an increasing function of x so that (G5) is satisﬁed. Furthermore, if x ∈ R++, then C4
behaves as C2,a with a ∈ (0, 1+ r) when t goes to inﬁnity, implying that (G2) is satisﬁed.
If x = 0, then (G2) is trivially satisﬁed. To verify that (G3) is satisﬁed, note that
x− g(x)
2
=
(
1− 2
3
)
x = 1
3
x ≤ 4
9
x =
(
4
3
− 8
9
)
x = g(x)− g2(x)
2
if 0 ≤ x ≤ 3
4
,
x− g(x)
2
=
(
1− 2
3
)
x = 1
3
x = 1
3
x =
(
4
3
− 1)x = g(x)− g2(x)
2
if 4
3
< x ≤ 1,
x− g(x)
2
=
(
1− 3
4
)
x = 1
4
x ≤ 3
8
x =
(
3
2
− 9
8
)
x = g(x)− g2(x)
2
if x > 1.
Hence, it follows from Theorem 2 that the inﬁnite-horizon choice function C4 satisﬁes
eﬃciency, time consistency, Suppes-Sen and Pigou-Dalton. However,
1− g(1)
2
= 1− 2
3
= 1
3
> 5
18
= 10
9
− 5
6
= 10
9
− g(10/9)
2
.
Hence, (G6) does not hold, and it follows from Theorem 3 that C4 does not satisfy resource
monotonicity.
Examples 2, 3 and 4 show that the conditions characterizing Suppes-Sen and Pigou-
Dalton—namely that gt(x) and gt(x) − gt+1(x)/(1 + r) are monotone with respect to
t—are independent of the conditions characterizing resource monotonicity—namely that
gt(x) and gt(x)− gt+1(x)/(1 + r) are monotone with respect to x.
We conclude with an example showing that condition (G5) is not necessary for an
inﬁnite-horizon choice function to satisfy time consistency and resource monotonicity, as
long as eﬃciency is not imposed.
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Example 5. The inﬁnite-horizon choice function C5 of this example is obtained by setting
r = 1, so that 1 + r = 2, and by letting g be given by:
g(x) =
⎧⎨
⎩
2x if 0 ≤ x ≤ 1,
2(x− 1
2
) if x > 1.
Clearly (G1) is satisﬁed, while condition (G5) is not satisﬁed, since
g(1) = 2 > 3
2
= g
(
5
4
)
.
Resource monotonicity still holds since, by substituting into (CG), it follows that
C5(x) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(0, 0, . . . ) if x = 0,(
0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+1 times
, 1
2
, 1
2
, . . .
)
if x ∈ ((1
2
)n+1, (1
2
)n
]
for n ∈ Z+,
(
1
2
, 1
2
, . . .
)
if x > 1.
It is straightforward to verify that C5 does not satisfy eﬃciency; in particular, increas-
ing the initial resource stock beyond x does not lead to increased consumption for any
generation, provided that x > 1.
Examples 1 and 2 provide inﬁnite-horizon choice functions that are continuous in the
initial endowment, even though there are no continuous orderings satisfying strong Pareto
and ﬁnite anonymity that rationalize them. This observation serves to further underline
the gains that are possible from adopting a choice-theoretic approach.
6 Concluding remarks
We conclude this paper with some thoughts on possible directions where the approach of
this paper might be taken in future work. An issue that suggests itself naturally when
considering a choice function is its rationalizability by a relation deﬁned on the objects of
choice—in our case, inﬁnite consumption streams. The rationalizability of choice functions
with arbitrary domains has been examined thoroughly in contributions such as Richter
(1966) and Hansson (1968) and, more recently, Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2005)
and Bossert and Suzumura (2005). While the generality of the results obtained in these
papers allows for their application in our intergenerational setting, it might be possible to
obtain new observations due to the speciﬁc structure of the domain considered here. Note
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that the existence of a rationalizing ordering does not conﬂict with the impossibility results
established for such orderings in the earlier literature: the existence of a rationalization
of an inﬁnite-horizon choice function satisfying requirements such as Suppes-Sen does not
imply that the choice function is rationalizable by an ordering that possesses properties
such as the Suppes-Sen principle formulated for binary relations.
An interesting diﬀerence emerges when the technology parameter r is equal to zero
instead of positive, as we have assumed throughout the paper. In that case, Suppes-
Sen and the conjunction of eﬃciency and Pigou-Dalton no longer are equivalent—in fact,
their implications are strikingly diﬀerent. If r = 0, then the Pigou-Dalton principle rules
out the choice of any unequal stream. Thereby the principle becomes incompatible with
eﬃciency because, for any ﬁnite initial endowment x, the only possible equal choice is
zero consumption in every period, which clearly violates eﬃciency if x is positive. On the
other hand, Suppes-Sen reduces to eﬃciency because no stream that is not dominated
according to the eﬃciency criterion is dominated by a permutation of any feasible stream.
As mentioned earlier, we made the conscious choice to work with a simple model in
order to emphasize the novel aspect of the paper—the choice-theoretic approach in an
inﬁnite-horizon setting. It might turn out to be of interest to explore possible generaliza-
tions in future work.
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